Partly WRong But Wholly Right: THe Conceptual Conflation of Two Senses of structure (forthcoming in Feminist Philosophy Quarertly)
An enduring debate within philosophy and the social sciences focuses on the unit of explanation for social phenomena. The two poles of this debate are often identified as methodological individualism and holism/structuralism. In this paper I will argue that at least some of the debate between individualism and structuralism within philosophy has been obscured by a conceptual confusion caused by inconsistencies and imprecision in the use of the term ‘structure’. To delineate two meanings, I introduce a distinction between parts-structuralist claims and whole-structuralist claims. Further, I will argue that the conflation of the two senses of structure lead to an unjustified inference from w-structuralism to p-structuralism and give a preliminary argument against p-structuralism. My aim in the paper is to show that clarity in our use of ‘structure’, particularly in relation to levels of explanation, can resolve at least some of the contemporary debate between individualism and structuralism.
Social Norms, Intrinsic Motivation, and Oppression (In Progress)
In Davidson and Kelly (2020), we argued that social norms are a mediating layer between individuals and structures that are often overlooked in debates about the primacy of individuals or structures in explanations of social phenomenon. Extending this argument, this paper uses the lens of social norms to argue for the importance of the relationship between individuals and structures for describing, explaining, and ameliorating oppression based on social identity (e.g. race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, disability, body size). Specifically, this paper will explore the connection between intrinsic motivation to comply with social norms (Kelly 2020), interpersonal interactions that uphold oppression, and internalized oppression. My aim is to provide a pluralist alternative to structuralist accounts that propose structures are either the more important (Haslanger 2015) or the only thing (Martín 2020) that matters for explaining oppression.